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States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 506 F.2d 796 (3d Cir. 1974).
In the course of its land-acquisition program for the proposed
Tocks Island recreational area,1 the United States in 1970 instituted a condemnation proceeding against three separate tracts of
land owned by the Southeastern Pennsylvania Synod of the Lutheran Church in America (Synod). 2 The land in question, situated
along the Delaware River in Monroe County, Pennsylvania, was
used by the Synod in its operation of three summer camps.3 The
United States offered compensation in the amount of $485,400,
but the defendant Synod claimed that it would cost more than $5.8
million to develop new camping facilities at a different location. 4
1 The

Tocks Island Project was launched in 1961 with the creation of the Delaware

River Basin Compact, an agreement among the federal government and the states of New
York, New jersey, and Delaware, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Joint Resolution of
Sept. 27, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat 688-89, 711. The Compact, formed for the purpose
of developing water and other natural resources of the Basin, was empowered to construct
dams and reservoirs and to acquire by condemnation any lands within the basin necessary for its
projects. Id.
Four years later Congress created the Delaware Water Gap National Recreation Area as
part of the Tocks Island Project and gave the Secretary of the Army the power to acquire
land for development. Act of Sept. 1, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-158, 79 Stat. 612 (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 460 o (1970)).
2 United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 506 F.2d 796, 798 (3d Cir. 1974). United States
federal courts view an eminent domain proceeding as a suit by the Government against a
landowner and not as a suit by the condemnee to collect a money payment. 6 NICHOLS ON
EMINENT DOMAIN § 24.113 (rev. 3d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as NICHOLS]. FED. R. Civ. P.
71A governs procedure in federal condemnation actions.
3 United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 506 F.2d 796, 798 (3d Cir. 1974). The
appellant Synod joined with the Northeastern Pennsylvania Synod of the Lutheran Church in
America in forming the Eastern Pennsylvania Lutheran Camp Corporation, a Pennsylvania
nonprofit corporation which conducted the camp program. Brief for Appellant at 5-6,
United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 506 F.2d 796 (3d Cir. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
Appellant's Briefi.
Camp Miller, which had been acquired in 1927, covered approximately 82 acres of land
and was utilized by the Synod as a campsite for 1450 boys annually. Camp Hagan, containing 40 acres, was bought by the Synod in 1937 and was operated as a camp for nearly 1400
young girls every year. Camp Ministerium, obtained in 1945, consisted of approximately 184
acres devoted to family camping for 600 persons every year. Appendix to Brief for Appellant
at lOa-1 la, United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 506 F.2d 796 (3d Cir. 1974) [hereinafter
cited as Appendix to Appellant's Brief]. The Synod is currently running Camp Hagan and
Camp Ministerium as the government's lessee. Id. at 36a.
I United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 506 F.2d 796, 798 (3d Cir. 1974). The great
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During the pretrial proceedings, 5 the trial judge, granting a
request by the Government, ruled "that the cost of 'substitute
facilities' is not a proper measure of compensation for the taking of
defendant's property," 6 but the court reserved ruling on the valuation standard to be applied at trial.7 The court also held that the
cost of substitute facilities was available as a measure of compensation only to a governmental condemnee.8 In response, the Synod
filed a motion requesting that the district court amend its pretrial
order to include the certification necessary for an interlocutory
appeal. 9 The trial judge granted this motion. 0
In United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land," the Third Circuit
reversed the district court's pretrial order and held that in an
disparity between these two figures results from several factors. For example, the operation
of certain grandfather clauses in the Pennsylvania legislation governing the construction and
operation of campgrounds and public buildings exempted preexisting camps from compliance. A new campground, however, would require building an entire sewage treatment
facility to replace the septic tanks in use at the condemned campgrounds. The Synod
estimated that this would exceed the cost of direct reproduction of the present septic tank
systems by $412,400. Appellant's Brief, supra note 3, at 7.
The Synod also claimed that new camps would be subject to the provisions of Chapter
191 of the Department of Environmental Resources Regulations and the regulations of the
American Standard National Plumbing Code, compliance with which would add a combined
extra cost of $28,065. Id.
In addition to compliance with state law, relocation would also require construction of a
dam, access and onsite roads, and a power line in order to provide an equivalent to what
was already available at the old sites. The Synod estimated the cost of these facilities to be
nearly $2 million. Id. at 8.
1 The action was commenced pursuant to a complaint dated June 15, 1970. Appendix to
Appellant's Brief, supra note 3' at Ia. On December 15, 1972, the Government filed a request
in the federal district court for the middle district of Pennsylvania for pretrial rulings, one of
which stated that "tihe cost of substitute facilities is not a proper measure of compensation for
the taking of defendants' property."Id. at 5a, 7a. The Synod's answer opposed this request and
asked the trial judge to rule that
[t]he cost of substitute facilities is the proper measure of just compensation in the
condemnation of a public charitable use for the replacement of which there is
reasonable need.
Id. at 8a.
6 United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 506 F.2d 796, 798 (3d Cir. 1974).
Appendix to Appellant's Brief, supra note 3, at 61a.
United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 506 F.2d 796, 798 (3d Cir. 1974).
Appendix to Appellant's Brief, supra note 3, at 62a. This appeal was brought pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970) which provides in pertinent part:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The
Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken
from such order . . ..
"

Appendix to Appellant's Brief, supra note 3, at 62a.
506 F.2d 796 (3d Cir. 1974).
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appropriate case the substitute facilities measure of just compensation "is available to private owners of non-profit community
facilities as well as to public owners of such facilities." 2 Noting this to
be a novel question,' 3 the court first pointed out that it was concerned
with the measure of indemnification imposed by the "taking" clause
of the fifth amendment.' 4 Judge Gibbons, writing for the court,
reasoned that it was inconceivable that this clause should mandate a
greater degree of compensation for public owners than for private
6
owners.' 5 Since courts have long held that a governmental entity'
may be entitled to substitute facilities in certain circumstances,' 7 and
since Congress has not authorized a distinction between the measure
of fair compensation for governmental and nongovernmental
facilities in this particular instance,' the court found no basis for
awarding a greater amount of compensation for public than for
private property when both are devoted to public use.' 9 In addition,
if such a distinction were to exist, it would allow the Government to
choose locations on the discriminatory basis of paying less compensa20
tion to private than to public owners of community facilities.
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no private property shall "be taken for public use, without just compensation."' I Courts generally strive to apply this protection against confiscation by the Government in such a way as to
12 Id. at 802.
" Id. at 800. Federal courts have on many occasions discussed the applicability of the
substitute facilities doctrine to condemned public property. See, e.g., United States v. Certain
Property, 403 F.2d 800, 803 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Certain Land, 346 F.2d 690,
695 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. City of Jacksonville, 257 F.2d 330, 333 (8th Cir. 1958);
United States v. Board of Educ., 253 F.2d 760, 763 (4th Cir. 1958).
1' 506 F.2d at 801. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in pertinent part: "nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation."

IS 506 F.2d at 801.
II

The phrase "governmental entity" will be used throughout this Note to denote any

unit of government whose property might be the object of a federal condemnation proceed-

ing.
'7 See Town of Bedford v. United States, 23 F.2d 453,456 (1st Cir. 1927); United States v.
Town of Nahant, 153 F. 520,524 (Ist Cir. 1907). For a discussion of how various circumstances
may relate to the need for a replacement see note 50 infra.
Is 506 F.2d at 801. The legislature is free to establish statutory procedures for condemnation, "subject to the constitutional limitation guaranteeing the rights of the owner." 6
NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 24.2 (footnote omitted).
19 506 F.2d at 801.
20 Id.

21 U.S. CONsT. amend. V. "Private property" as used in the fifth amendment has been
held to include property that is publicly owned. United States v. Wheeler Twp., 66 F.2d 977,982
(8th Cir. 1933). See Jefferson County v. TVA, 146 F.2d 564, 565(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S.
871 (1945); Town of Bedford v. United States, 23 F.2d 453,454(1st Cir. 1927); United States v.
Town of Nahant, 153 F. 520, 521, 523 (1st Cir. 1907).
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indemnify the property owner for his loss. 22 What this means in
practical terms is that "[t]he owner is to be put in as good [a]
position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if his property had
not been taken. ' 23 In a further refinement of this concept, courts
have applied the fair market value standard as the most practical
device by which to4 measure an owner's loss for property taken by
2
the Government.
The Supreme Court of the United States has stated "that
market value is what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing
seller. ' 25 In evaluating such a hypothetical transaction, courts look
to the value of the tangible property interests 2 6 at the time of the
taking. 2 7 Such an evaluation may involve the consideration of ancillary factors which affect the worth of the property to the average
28
buyer and seller.
Fair market value is not a measure of the personal worth of
property to the owner at the time of condemnation. 29 Property will
21 Westchester County Park Comm'n v. United States, 143 F.2d 688,691 (2d Cir. 1944). See
also United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 631 (1961). 4 NICHOLS, supra note
2, § 12.1[4].
23 United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943) (footnote omitted).
24 See, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973); Almota Farmers Elevator &
Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 474 (1973); United States v. Virginia Elec. &
Power Co., 365 U.S. 624,633 (1961); United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation
Co., 338 U.S. 396,402 (1949); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369,374 (1943); Olson v. United
States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934); City of New York v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57,61 (1915); United States
v. 344.85 Acres of Land, 384 F.2d 789, 791 (7th Cir. 1967); Nebraska v. United States, 164 F.2d
866, 868 (8th Cir. 1947).
25 United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943). One commentator has defined fair
market value as
the amount of money which a purchaser willing but not obliged to buy the property
would pay to an owner willing but not obliged to sell it, taking into consideration all
uses for which the land was suited and might in reason be applied.
4 NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 12.211] (footnotes omitted).
26 Comment, Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment: Incidental Losses, 67
YALE L.J. 61, 61 (1957); Note, Restoration Costs as an Alternative Measure of Severance Damages
in Eminent Domain Proceedings, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 800, 801 (1969).
27 4 NICHoLs, supra note 2, § 12.23. For a discussion of the methods courts use to determine
"the time of the taking," see id.
21 See, e.g., Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470
(1973). In Almota the Government condemned an underlying fee and a leasehold on the fee
held by the petitioner, which had built improvements in expectation of renewal of a lease
which it had held continually on successive leases since 1919. Id. at 470-71. The Supreme
Court held that just compensation was to be measured by the fair market value of the
improvements, taking into account the possibility that the lease might or might not have
been renewed. Id. at 474, 478.
But see United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973). Fuller held that the fifth amendment
required no compensation for any value derived from a condemnee's use of his land in
conjunction with adjoining federal land for which he held grazing permits. Id. at 489,
493-94.
29 4 NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 12.22[2]. This treatise states:
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not be valued in terms of the income which it produces30 or any
sentimental value which it might hold for the owner.3 ' However,
the owner is free to prove that any special value that the property
has to him would influence the price a buyer would be willing to
pay on the open market.3 2
Condemnation proceedings are in rem and just compensation must be based upon
the value of the rights taken, without regard to the personality of the owner or his
personal relationship to the property taken. The value of the property for his
personal purposes must be disregarded.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Losses of intangible interests are referred to as" 'incidental' "or" 'consequential.' "Denial
of compensation for such losses seems to deviate from the indemnity theory behind the fifth
amendment's taking clause. I L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN §
14, at 75 (2d ed. 1953). See also Spies & McCoid, Recovery of ConsequentialDamages in Eminent
Domain, 48 VA. L. REV. 437 (1962) (advocating compensation for consequential losses wherever
practical).
30 4 NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 12.22[2]. Nor will the condemnee-owner of commercial
property generally be compensated for any good will or going concern value which his property
might carry. Banner Milling Co. v. State, 240 N.Y. 533, 540-41, 148 N.E. 668, 670 (1925). See
also Comment, supra note 26, at 74-76; Note, Eminent Domain: The Problem of Damages When
Land HasBeen Adapted toa Special Use, 37 B.U.L. REV. 495,501 (1957). Contra, UNIFORM EMINENT
DOMAIN CODE § 1016.

Nor is the cost of relocating a business compensable when the Government has appropriated the entire underlying leasehold or fee. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg.
Co., 339 U.S. 261, 264 (1950); United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 378 (1946).
The situation is different when the taking is of a temporary nature. In Kimball Laundry
Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949), the Government condemned petitioner's laundry
plant for use by the Army during World War II, rendering the condemnee unable to service
a clientele developed over the years. Id. at 3-4. The Supreme Court ruled that this temporary taking was a compensable interest because the laundry held a reversion in the property,
and that property would come back to the condemnee minus the value of the trade routes
appropriated by the Government. Id. at 14-16. The Court distinguished this from the taking
of an entire fee, where the going concern value is not compensable. Since the temporary
condemnee cannot dispose of his property and his future alternatives are made uncertain, he is
therefore eligible for compensation. Id. See Comment,supra note 26, at 83. See also United States
v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 383 (1945).
31 4 NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 12.22[2].
32 In so doing, the condemnLe-owner would be offering proof of the "highest and best
use" of his property. Highest and best use has been defined as "'that available use and
program for future utilization of a parcel of land that produces the highest present land
value.' " Searles, Highest and Best Use: The Keystone of Valuation in Eminent Domain, 45 N.Y.S.B.J.
36, 39 (1973).
In Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934), the Supreme Court discussed highest
and best use as follows:
The sum required to be paid the owner does not depend upon the uses to which he
has devoted his land but is to be arrived at upon just consideration of all the uses
for which it is suitable. The highest and most profitable use for which the property
is adaptable and needed or likely to be needed in the reasonably near future is to be
considered, not necessarily as the measure of value, but to the full extent that the
prospect of demand for such use affects the market value while the property is
privately held.
Id. at 255.
Courts limit this concept by requiring that the use in question not be too speculative. See
4 NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 12.32[1]; Note, supra note 30, at 501-02; cf. United States v. Easement
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Courts frequently rely on evidence of comparable sales to arrive
at market value, 33 but if land is improved in order to serve a unique
purpose there will not be an active market to supply information as to
the going rate for the property in question. Schools, churches, and
roads are examples of property that carries worth to the owner but is
not included in a market for land adapted to a more common use. 4
When such property is condemned, the courts must turn to alternate
methods of valuation to determine the actual loss to the owner. 35
Capitalization of earnings and cost of reproduction less depreciation are the two compensation standards used by courts when
privately owned special use property is involved. The former
method capitalizes rental income of land and improvements and
converts it into an indication of present value which is then added
to the separate value of the land. 36 The reproduction method
estimates the cost of building a replacement for the condemned
structure and subtracts from that amount a charge for depreciation
of the condemned property. 37 Both of these methods are intended
to provide a rough approximation of fair market value, but they
tend to stray from the indemnification theory upon which the
concept of just compensation rests. For example, in the case of a
business, the capitalization approach ignores the owner's profits38
which, although not property in the technical sense, often constitute the major portion of the loss. Reproduction cost similarly
ignores the theory that reimbursing the owner for his initial cost
and Right of Way 100 Feet Wide, 447 F.2d 1317, 1319-20 (6th Cir. 1971). Thus there is no
compensation for lost opportunities. See, e.g., United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S.
266, 281 (1943).
33 See, e.g., United States v. 13,255.53 Acres of Land, 158 F.2d 874, 876 (3d Cir. 1946);
United States v. 206.82 Acres of Land, 205 F. Supp. 91, 93 (M.D. Pa. 1962).
" See 506 F.2d at 799; Note,Just Compensationand the Public Condemnee, 75 YALE L.J. 1053,
1053 (1966); Note, supra note 30, at 495-96.
35 Fair market value is not the exclusive measure of valuation by which the courts arrive
at just compensation. The Supreme Court has stated that
fair market value . . . is "not an absolute standard nor an exclusive method of
valuation." . . . The constitutional requirement of just compensation derives as
much content from the basic equitable principles of fairness ... as its [sic] does from
technical concepts of property law.
United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S 488, 490 (1973) (quoting from United States v. Virginia
Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 633 (1961)) (citations omitted). The Court "has refused to
make a fetish . . . of market value, since that may not be the best measure of value in some
cases." United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949).
36 4 NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 12.32 [3] [c].
37 Id. § 12.32 [3] [b]. To that amount is added the present fair market value of the land.
Wilmington Housing Authority v. Greater St. John Baptist Church, 291 A.2d 282, 285 (Del.
1972).
31 Cf 4 NICHOLS, supra note 2, 12.32 [3] [c].
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does not indemnify him for his true loss 39 since it fails to measure
compensation by the value of the property to the condemnee.4 °
When a governmental entity owns condemned property for
which a ready market does not exist, such as roads or schools,
courts have recognized that the public welfare may require compensation in the form of substitute facilities. 41 Under this theory,
the Government is obliged to finance a replacement that will provide a functional equivalent to the condemned property. 42 Only
in this way can the entire community be indemnified for the loss
occasioned by the taking. Here the courts depart from the concept
of market value and look instead to the cost of whatever equivalent
43
facilities will restore the community's welfare to its former level.
City of Fort Worth v. United States4 4 provides a good example of
how the courts have applied the substitute facility doctrine to the
condemnation of a public road. 4 5 After condemning a major traffic
artery in Fort Worth, Texas, the federal government took the
position that it would not have to provide any additional roads as
39 United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co., 338 U.S. 396, 403
(1949); Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U.S. 106, 123 (1924).
The reproduction cost standard ofjust compensation has been subject to criticism. United
States v. Benning Housing Corp., 276 F.2d 248, 250 (5th Cir. 1960).
Courts which do use the cost approach often require the existence of certain conditions:
(1)the interest condemned must be one of complete ownership; (2) there must be a
showing that a substantial reproduction would be a reasonable business venture and
(3) a proper allowance be made for depreciation.
NICHOLS supra note 2, § 12.32 [3] [b] (footnotes omitted).
4" Reproduction cost may not reflect value to the condemnee because "under the
circumstances of a particular case, no one might wish to reproduce the improvement."
United States v. 55.22 Acres of Land, 411 F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1969).
41 See Level, Evaluation of Special Purpose Properties in Condemnation Proceedings, 3 URB.
LAw. 428, 432 (1971); Note, supra note 34, 75 YALE L.J. at 1053.
42 United States v. Certain Property, 403 F.2d 800, 804 (2d Cir. 1968); Town of
Clarksville v. United States, 198 F.2d 238, 24243 (4th Cir. 1952); City of Fort Worth v.
United States, 188 F.2d 217, 221 (5th Cir. 1951).
The functional equivalent need not be an exact duplicate. United States v. Certain
Property, supra at 804. See United States v. Arkansas, 164 F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1947), wherein the
Government was obliged to finance the cost of a temporary ferry which the state operated
pending completion of a bridge to replace a road taken in a dam project. Id. at 944-45.
" The substitute facility doctrine is not an exception to the fair market value test.
United States v. Certain Property, 403 F.2d 800, 803 (2d Cir. 1968). "When circumstances
warrant, it is another arrow to the trier's bow when confronted by the issue of just compensation." Id.
44 188 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1951).
4' Courts have engaged in extensive discussion of the need for substitute roadways in
compensation cases. See, e.g., United States v. Certain Lands, 246 F.2d 823 (3d Cir. 1957);
Washington v. United States, 214 F.2d 33 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 862 (1954); City
and County of Honolulu v. United States, 188 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849
(1951); United States v. City of New York, 168 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1948).
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long as there were adjacent highways which could handle the total
traffic flow in the area.4 6 The city maintained that the "adjacent
facilities" referred to by the Government had been built in order
"to provide additional" traffic arteries and therefore could not be
47
considered a substitute for the condemned road.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
agreed with Fort Worth and held that the city was entitled to new
traffic facilities that would be of "the same status of utility" 48 as

those prior to the condemnation. The court noted the obligation of
a municipality to provide necessary traffic facilities and reasoned
that any well-planned thoroughfare aids in the discharge of that
duty. 49 The fact that the alternate routes managed to carry traffic
that once used the condemned roadway was not dispositive of the
issue-the true test of compensation was the amount needed to
ensure that the roads in the area of the condemnation would serve
50
community "needs in as adequate a manner" as the old highway.

The Supreme Court of Kansas has applied similar concepts in
4. 188 F.2d at 219.
47 Id. at 219-20.
48

Id. at 221.

49 Id.
50 Id. at 222. The situation would have been different had the government project

obviated the need for a roadway. In Washington v. United States, 214 F.2d 33 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 862 (1954), the Government condemned a stretch of state highway that
traversed a rural area to be used in the development of an atomic energy project. 214 F.2d at 38.
The entire installation was closed to the public and all residents living in the project area were
moved. Id. The state claimed the need for a substitute facility, id. at 41, but the court found that
there was no need for the construction of a new highway. Id. at 44. The condemned road had
been unpaved and involved a ferry crossing, whereas an alternate route provided a paved
highway and bridge. In addition, the traveling time between the towns served by the roads in
question was the same. Id. at 42. In holding as a matter of law that there was no need for a
substitute highway, id. at 44, the court affirmed a lower court ruling which had allowed nominal
damages only.Id. at 36,47. See also, United States v. Cityof New York, 168 F.2d 387,389 (2d Cir.
1948); Woodville v. United States, 152 F.2d 735, 737 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 842
(1946); United States v. Des Moines County, 148 F.2d 448,449 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
743 (1945); Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. United States, 147 F.2d 786, 791 (4th Cir.
1945); Jefferson County v. TVA, 146 F.2d 564, 565 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 871 (1945).
The reason for not awarding compensation in these cases is given in United States
v. City of New York, supra at 389-90, as follows:
The rationale is clear. If the municipality has not had to provide substitutes, then it
has suffered no financial loss and hence is not entitled to substantial damages.
Indeed, the taking relieves it of the burden of maintaining such roads.
Also, the Government need not pay the cost of a replacement if it provides an adequate
substitute as part of its own project. Note, supra note 34, 75 YALE L.J. at 1057.
It should be noted that a governmental entity can still collect the fair market value of its
land even if there is no need for a substitute. United States v. Certain Land, 346 F.2d 690,
695 (2d Cir. 1965). See California v. United States, 395 F.2d 261, 263 (9th Cir. 1968); United
States v. City of Jacksonville, 257 F.2d 330, 333 (8th Cir. 1958). Contra, United States v. City
of New York, supra at 389.
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evaluating just compensation for the condemnation of a public
school building. In City of Wichita v. Unified School District No. 259," t
a forty-year-old school building was condemned to make way for
the construction of an interstate highway.5 2 After the schoolhouse
was closed, the children were allocated among three local schools,
where either additional facilities had been built or the existing
53
classrooms were sufficient to accommodate the influx of students.
The dispute centered around the method of ascertaining compensation: The school district claimed that it was entitled to substitute
facilities while the city contended that it should pay either fair
market value or the cost of constructing a similar building less a
5 "4
charge for depreciation and obsolescence.
The court held that the district was entitled to the cost of a
substitute,55 and, after reviewing several authorities, pointed out
that a special purpose property such as a school, "not ordinarily
bandied about in the market place," carries a value that must be
tested by a standard other than fair market value. 5 6 The court cited
prior cases which relied on the "'equitable concept of justice and
fairness that accords with the Fifth Amendment's mandate' ,,57 and
which emphasized the principle that the condemnee was entitled to
compensation that provided a replacement of "equal utility" for
that which was taken. 58 On this basis, the fact that the cost of the
S1
52

201 Kan. 110, 439 P.2d 162 (1968).
Id. at 111, 439 P.2d at 164.

13 Id. at 117-18, 439 P.2d at 169.
54 Id.
at 112, 439 P.2d at 165. The parties had agreed for trial purposes that it would
cost $307,184 to replace the buildings. The trial court held that the cost of a substitute
facility was to be the measure of compensation and therefore directed a verdict in that
amount. Id. at 112, 117, 439 P.2d at 165, 168-69.
However the trial court granted a directed verdict regarding the payment to be made
for the land upon which the schoolhouse had been located. Id. at 117, 439 P.2d at 169. This
amount took into consideration only the land required for the additional classroom space at
the one school which had built new facilities. The school district claimed that this was only a
temporary measure and insisted on its right to show the need for more land. Id. at 118, 439
P.2d at 169. The state supreme court, noting that the substitute facility doctrine applies to
land as well as to buildings, id., remanded the case for a new trial on the issue of the school
district's need for additional land. Id. at 121, 439 P.2d at 171.
55 Id. at 117, 439 P.2d at 168.
56 Id. at 113, 439 P.2d at 166.
11 Id. at 115, 439 P.2d at 167 (quoting from Town of Clarksville v. United States, 198
F.2d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 1952)).
58 201 Kan. at 115, 439 P.2d at 167. The court cited United States v. Board of Educ.,
253 F.2d 760 (4th Cir. 1958), and State v. Waco Independent School Dist., 364 S.W.2d 263
(Tex. Civ. App. 1963), as cases which supported the proposition that condemned school
properties should be replaced with the functional equivalent of their precondemnation
condition. 201 Kan. at 115, 439 P.2d at 167.
The court could also have relied on United States v. Certain Land, 346 F.2d 690 (2d
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substitute facility was more than the original price for the con59
demned property was considered irrelevant.
Important to the holdings in Fort Worth and Wichita was the
fact that the cities had respective legal obligations to provide necessary traffic and educational facilities. This emphasis on the public
condemnee's legal duty to replace was softened somewhat in United
States v. Certain Property.60 In that case the federal government
condemned an entire city block for use by the Post Office Department. Included in this taking was a public bath and recreation
building owned and operated by the City of New York and used
free of charge by over 200,000 people annually. 61 Although the
city had the requisite statutory authority to maintain a bath and
recreation center, it was under no legal obligation to do so. 6

2

In

response to the city's claims for compensation in the amount of
funds adequate to provide a replacement, the trial court pointed to
the lack of legal compulsion to provide such a facility and awarded
63
only fair market value.
In reversing, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the distinction between legal compulsion and
social necessity as a standard by which to determine whether a
public condemnee is entitled to the cost of replacement facilities as
just compensation, holding that "the distinction has little practical
significance in public condemnation.

' 64

Rather, the court noted

that consideration should be given to pertinent opinions and deciCir. 1965), wherein the Government condemned land which the City of New York had
acquired and cleared for a playground which the city was required by law to provide at a
school facility. The Second Circuit reasoned that such a case called for application of the
substitute facility doctrine in order to provide facilities "'necessary' to carry out the public
function served by the condemned property." Id. at 695. The decision did not rely on the
legal compulsion to build a playground but pointed out that "'necessity' . . . looks to the
pragmatic needs and possibilities, not just to technical legal minima." Id. (citations omitted).
11 201 Kan. at 116-17, 439 P.2d at 168 (citing Town of Clarksville v. United States, 198
F.2d 238, 243 (4th Cir. 1952), and City of Fort Worth v. United States, 188 F.2d 217, 223,
(5th Cir. 1951)).
This holding recognizes the principle that the substitute facility doctrine is not a method
of valuation. The courts view just compensation in a different light when a governmental
entity is the victim of a condemnation proceeding and aim at putting the public in as close a
position as possible to the pre-taking condition. The dollar loss to the community is not a
controlling factor. United States v. Certain Property, 403 F.2d 800, 803 (2d Cir. 1968).
60 403 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1968).
6' Id. at 801.
62 N. Y. GEN. MUNIC. LAW § 121 (McKinney 1965) provides:
Any city, village or town may establish and maintain free public baths, and any
city, village or town may appropriate of its funds for the purpose of establishing
such free public baths.
63 403 F.2d at 802.
64 Id. at 803. Cf. United States v. Certain Land, 346 F.2d 690, 695 (2d Cir. 1965).
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sions of local officials in assessing the necessity of providing certain
community facilities. 6 5 More importantly, the court said:
If application of the "substitute facilities" theory depended on
finding a statutory requirement, innumerable nonlegal
obliga66
tions to service the community would be ignored.
The court, however, limited its holding by stating that not every
condemned facility need be replaced 67 and that "[e]xact duplication is not essential; the substitute need only be functionally equiva6
lent." s

This departure from the emphasis on a legal duty as the basis
for replacement was of great import to the holding in 564.54
Acres. 6 9 There was of course no legal duty on the part of the Synod
to replace the camps, but if the court viewed those facilities as a
necessary element in the community's efforts to provide healthful
recreation for thousands of children each year, the Certain Property
opinion provided strong support for requiring a substitute based
upon local necessity.
Although no other federal appellate court had ruled on the
application of the substitute facility doctrine to nongovernmental
owners, 70 the Third Circuit in 564.54 Acres was able to rely on a
65 403 F.2d at 803. It is important to note that the court is not suggesting that local laws
should govern the condemnation proceeding. The court is merely pointing out that the
criterion for replacement should be local attitude rather than legal compulsion. Federal law
governs in federal eminent domain cases. United States v. 93.970 Acres of Land, 360 U.S.
328, 332-33 (1959); United States v. Certain Interests in Property, 271 F.2d 379, 384 (7th
Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 974 (1960); United States v. Mahowald, 209 F.2d 751, 752
(8th Cir. 1954).
61 403 F.2d at 804.
" Id. See note 50 supra.
68 403 F.2d at 804. The court also ruled that the amount of compensation should be
reduced by a charge for depreciation of the old building. The opinion relied on the
equitable principles undergirding just compensation [to] require that the substitution cost be discounted by reason of the benefit which accrues to the condemnee
when a new building replaces one with expired useful years.
Id. The court suggested in a footnote that a mathematical formula be used to arrive at a
charge for depreciation which would be deducted from the cost of the new recreation
center. Id. n.1 1. The court thus adhered to the concept of compensation in the form of a
substitute that would provide equivalent utility and no more.
6 See 506 F.2d at 800.
70 The appellant Synod argued that two federal district court cases had provided
substitute facility compensation to private owners. Appellant's Brief, supra note 3, at 17-18.
The first case, United States v. 43.635 Acres of Land, 183 F. Supp. 168 (W.D. Mo. 1960),
involved a motion for remittitur by the Government following a negotiated settlement and
consent judgment for compensation owed to a power company for an easement taken by the
United States in conjunction with the condemnation of a tract of land on which the easement
had been located. The motion was denied, and in the course of the decision the court mentioned
in dicta that the United States had settled with the power company for the cost of providing a
new right-of-way. Id. at 169-70.
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Massachusetts case that supplied some support for the holding.
Newton Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority"'
involved the condemnation of a wide strip of land across a Girl Scout
camp ground. The Turnpike Authority had awarded nominal damages amounting to $5, but ajury trial resulted in ajudgment of $9,500
to be awarded to the condemnee.7 2 The latter amount was influenced
to a great extent by trial court rulings which excluded evidence
73
offered by the condemnee to show the degree of its monetary loss.

On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held
that the Girl Scout Council was entitled to receive fair compensation for the reduction in value of the remaining land 7 1 since the
planned construction of a superhighway would render the remaining property useless for the purposes for which it had been used.
The court also held that the trial judge should have impressed
upon the jury75 that the damages for a taking of such special use
property could not be measured exclusively by the effect the condemnation would have on property value in terms of "ordinary real
estate development. '76 The special purpose for which the property
The second case, United States v. 531.13 Acres of Land, 244 F. Supp. 895 (W.D.S.C.
1965), rev'd, 366 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1025 (1967), held that a
landowner was entitled to the cost of substitute facilities for flowage rights taken by the
Government in a navigable stream. This decision was reversed by the Fourth Circuit, the court
of appeals holding that the flowage rights did not represent a vested property right and were
not compensable. 366 F.2d at 917. It was therefore not called upon to consider compensation in
the form of a substitute.
The closest that the Supreme Court of the United States has come to ruling on the
substitute facility doctrine is the case of Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78 (1923), in which
the Court considered the constitutionality of the power of Congress to condemn land for use
as a substitute site for a town that had been taken in connection with a reservoir project. Id.
at 80. In upholding that power against a condemnee's objection that it involved the taking of
one man's land for sale to another, id. at 81, the Court pointed out that the real thrust of the
congressional scheme was a "transfer of the town from one place to another at the expense
of the United States." Id. at 82. But more importantly, the Court held that "[a] method of
compensation by substitution would seem to be the best means of making the parties whole,"
id. at 83, thus giving at least implicit approval to the substitute facilities theory as a correct
measure of compensation in certain cases.
"' 335 Mass. 189, 138 N.E.2d 769 (1956).
72 Id. at 190-91, 138 N.E.2d at 771. The court criticized the Turnpike Authority's
action in making a nominal award, pointing out that this practice disregards fair administrative procedure. Further, it "tends to coerce persons whose property has been taken to resort
to litigation and to incur unnecessary expense." Id. at 190-91 n.2, 138 N.E.2d at 771.
73Id. at 193, 138 N.E.2d at 772.
74Id. at 192-93, 138 N.E.2d at 772.
75 Ordinarily there is no constitutional right to a jury trial in an eminent domain
proceeding. City and County of Honolulu v. United States, 188 F.2d 459, 462 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951). However, if a dispute exists as to the amount of damages, the
question will ordinarily be tried before a jury. 6 NIcHOLS, supra note 2, § 26.52.
7' 335 Mass. at 200, 138 N.E.2d at 776.
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was used and for which it was best adapted resulted in an element
of value that market price did not include.
The holding in Newton is noteworthy because of the liberal
position which the court took concerning the evidence presented to
establish value. The court did not use an alternative to fair market
value-rather, it permitted the condemnee to show the value of the
property as adapted to its special purpose. 77 Objecting to the trial
court's charge as possibly misleading the jury "into believing that
only market value for purposes of sale for residential or other
conventional uses was to be considered, ' '7 8 the court preferred to

use a valuation standard which considered all reasonable uses of
the property, "including . . . the specialized use for which the
79
property was being employed" by the Girl Scouts.

564.54 Acres is the first case wherein a federal court has held
that a private owner of a nonprofit community facility should have
the opportunity to prove that it is entitled to the cost of a substitute
as a measure of just compensation. Judge Gibbons refused to go
further than this because the case came before the court solely for a
resolution of the issue of what standard of compensation would be
available to the Synod at trial.8 0 Such a preliminary stage of the
proceeding gave the court "no occasion to decide whether this is an
appropriate case" in which to apply the substitute facility doctrine
to the condemnee in question.'
Prior to this holding, the compensation standard sought by the
Synod had been available only to public condemnees by virtue of
their duty to provide for the public welfare. A loss to a governmental entity was a loss to the public in general, and the only way to
indemnify society was to replace the lost property.8 2 564.54 Acres
draws on this concept of community benefit and extends it to
private owners.
The court made this extension in order to avoid drawing a
distinction in law that does not exist in fact. The fifth amendment
protection against confiscation has been interpreted as mandating
any necessary substitute when the government condemns public
property. 83 The court reasoned that failure to extend this same
"' Here the court was departing from the rule which compensates only tangible property interests. See notes 29-31 supra and accompanying text.
" 335 Mass. at 200, 138 N.E.2d at 776.
79 Id. at 194, 138 N.E.2d at 773.
o 506 F.2d at 798, 802.
81 Id. at 802.
82 Id. at 799-800.
83 See Dau, Problems in Condemnation of Property Devoted to Public Use, 44 TEXAs L. REV.
1517, 1526-27 (1966); Level, supra note 41, at 431-32; Note, supra note 34, at 1053-54.
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protection to a private owner which devotes its property to a public
use would be to deny that private owner the full protection of the
84
fifth amendment.
The fact that church property was the object of the condemnation adds another dimension to the problem. A religious organization is of course entitled to full compensation if its land is taken by
the Government. There appears to be no reason why this compensation cannot take the form of a substitute facility if the property
had been devoted to a use which benefited the entire community
on a nondenominational basis. 85 The 564.54 Acres court saw a first
amendment issue arising in this case if the Government were allowed to select the property to be condemned on the discriminatory basis of paying less compensation for the taking of church
property than for condemnation of property owned by a governmental entity. 8 6 A choice of this nature, which has the effect of

using religion as a basis for action,8 7 would probably trigger establishment clause prohibitions on state activity in the area of religion.88 Thus, a uniform application of the fifth amendment guarantee of just compensation is especially important in light of potential
first amendment issues.
Prior to the Certain Property decision, courts often insisted that
s4 506 F.2d at 801. Such a distinction might carry equal protection overtones, since the due
process clause of the fifth amendment includes a guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); United States v. Pipefitters Local 562, 434 F.2d
1116, 1124 (8th Cir. 1970).
85 Although condemnation of church property is rare, when it does occur "[tihe lack of
a normal market makes valuation especially difficult." Comment, The Lord Buildeth and the
State Taketh Away-Church Condemnation and the Religion Clauses of the FirstAmendment, 46 COLO.
L. REv. 43, 55 (1974) (footnote omitted). The land itself will usually be valued according to
market price of land in the area, while compensation for improvements is normally measured by the cost of reproduction less depreciation. Level, supra note 41, at 437. See also
Wilmington Housing Authority v. Greater St. John Baptist Church, 291 A.2d 282, 284, 286
(Del. 1972); Assembly of God Church v. Vallone, 89 R.I. 1, 11, 150 A.2d 11, 16(1959). Delaware
has authorized by statute compensation in the amount of cost of replacement of the structure.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6108(e) (Supp. 1970).
86 506 F.2d at 801 & n.4.
87 See P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 17-18 (1962), in which the author argues
that the principles of the religion clauses of the first amendment
would be impossible of effectuation unless they are read together as creating a
doctrine more akin to the reading of the equal protection clause than to the due
process clause, i.e., they must be read to mean that religion may not be used as a
basis for classification for purposes of governmental action, whether that action be
the conferring of rights or privileges or the imposition of duties or obligations.
For discussion of the influence this theory has had on the Supreme Court see Kauper,
The Walz Decision: More on the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 69 MICH. L. REV. 179,
181, 198-200 (1970).
88 Cf Comment, supra note 85, at 51-55.
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the condemnee be under a legal obligation to replace the property.8 9 That opinion reduced this standard, as applied to public
owners, to a showing of reasonable necessity for a replacement."
The Third Circuit has now applied that standard to private owners. This leaves open the question of how courts are to determine
when there is a necessity to replace a condemned private facility
that had been used in the public interest. The courts should
examine the purpose that the property served and the benefit
derived from it by society as a whole. Such an approach would
require careful examination of local need and proof that a substitute would fulfill that need. 91 In addition, an owner able to demonstrate some degree of community reliance on the condemned
property would be even more likely to convince the courts of the need
for a replacement.
By determining that indemnification of the community rather
than value to the owner is the proper standard of just compensation for privately owned community facilities, Judge Gibbons has
introduced a novel concept to eminent domain law. It is perhaps
because there is little case law in the area from which to draw
support that the court was constrained to rely on Newton as precedent. Although the Newton court was concerned with evidence of
value and not with substitute facilities, 92 the opinion did take a
liberal approach in allowing evidence that related to proof of the
special value that the property held for the Girl Scouts, a nonprofit, community-oriented organization. The 564.54 Acres court
passed beyond this value theory of compensation to indemnification measured " 'in terms of . . . the loss to the community oc-

casioned by the condemnation.' "93 Thus, it is the spirit rather than
the letter of Newton which supports the holding in 564.54 Acres.
The question of the condemnee's legal duty to replace is intimately bound up with the distinction between public and private
owners of condemned property. The state is charged with provids9 See Note, supra note 34, 75 YALE L.J. at 1053.
90 403 F.2d at 804.
91 One commentator recommends that condemnation of public property should entitle
a local government to the cost of a substitute if the courts decide that the facility has served a
rational governmental purpose. Note, supranote 34, 75 YALE L.J. at 1055. The author suggests
that the courts examine the condemned facility's public purpose, the reasonableness of
providing a replacement, and the cost involved, in order to determine when the need for a
substitute facility exists. Id. at 1055-57. These standards could also be used in the case of a
private owner who claims compensation in the form of a substitute facility.
912See notes 71-79 supra and accompanying text.
13 506 F.2d at 800 (quoting from United States v. Certain Property, 403 F.2d 800, 804
(2d Cir. 1968)).
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ing for the public welfare and must rebuild when necessary,
whereas a private owner is under no obligation to use compensation funds in any specific way. The court did not address this issue,
presumably because of the preliminary nature of the proceeding.
However, a genuine administrative problem will be presented
whenever a private condemnee claims it is entitled to the cost of a
substitute by virtue of the nonprofit, community use to which it
devotes its property. Even if the Government were to agree, how
could it insure that compensation funds would be used only for the
construction of a functionally equivalent substitute?
One answer might be to allow the Government to supply compensation funds on a reimbursement basis. The condemnee would
be required to proceed with construction and at certain designated
intervals would be reimbursed for money expended on the project
to date. Any disputes between the parties could be resolved by the
courts. Such a system would require careful scrutiny since the
purpose of the award is the indemnification of the community and
94
not a windfall for the owner.
The effect of 564.54 Acres will be to strengthen the equitable
foundation upon which the concept of just compensation is said to
rest. Condemnation of the camps was a loss both to the Synod and
to the eastern Pennsylvania community in general. The measure of
compensation traditionally applied to private condemnees would
have fallen short of providing full indemnification. The opinion is
particularly appropriate when one considers that a publicly owned
camp serving basically the same area would have to be replaced at
5
government expense in the event of condemnation.1
Courts drawing upon the 564.54 Acres rationale must take
great care to confine themselves to the narrow principle for which
this case stands. Eminent domain is a necessary power of government and it would be impossible to provide every condemnee with
a perfect substitute for his property. In most cases the fair market
value standard must be used and will generally furnish a reliable
guide to the value of property to the owner. But where a nonprofit
9' This system would have to be closely monitored in order to prevent an attempt by
the Government to influence the way in which a church group spends its compensation
money in building a substitute for condemned property which had been used for a secular
community purpose. Such an action would probably be viewed as a governmental entanglement with religion to an extent forbidden by the first amendment. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970).
11 Philadelphia operates two comparable camps in the area. Appendix to Appellant's
Brief, supra note 3, at 12a & 40a.
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condemnee is supplying a service to the community, there is no
basis for using a different standard of compensation simply be96
cause the property does not lie in public hands.
Robert J. Brennan
9 See Level, supra note 41, at 432; Note, Compensationfor Municipal Property Condemned
by Federal Government, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 1096, 1097 (1948). The recently drafted UNIFORM
EMINENT DOMAIN CODE §§ 1004(b), (c) also takes this position:
... The fair market value of property owned by a public entity or other person
organized and operated upon a nonprofit basis is deemed to be not less than the
reasonable cost of functional replacement if the following conditions exist: (1) the
property is devoted to and is needed by the owner in order to continue in good faith its
actual use to perform a public function, or to render nonprofit educational, religious,
charitable, or eleemosynary services; and (2) the facilities or services are available to the
general public.
. .. The cost of functional replacement under subsection (b) includes (1) the cost of
a functionally equivalent site; (2) the cost of relocating and rehabilitating improvements taken, or if relocation and rehabilitation is impracticable, the cost of providing
improvements of substantially comparable character and of the same or equal utility;
and (3) the cost of betterments and enlargements required by law or by current
construction and utilization standards for similar facilities.
UNIFORM EMINENT DOMAIN CODE, § 1004.

